Full Case on the Motion: THW cut all aids to North Korea

This is a full opposition case I produced for the purpose of e-mailing it to a newspaper that asked me for this article. I thought it would be a good idea to share this on my blog too :)

THW Cut All Aid to North Korea-Opposition KMLA

According to the research produced by the Korea Rural Economic Institute, 2 million people in North Korea depend their lives annually on the humanitarian aids supplied by the South Korean government. That means 2 million people in North Korea rely their lives on the materialistic support we provide, such as grains, processed food, clothing, fuel, fertilizers and etc. South Korean aids appropriated 29% of North Korea’s food shortages during 2000-2008, which saved millions of lives and rescued the country out of its most difficult times. Not only that, but the provisionment was also proven to have beneficial effects on stabilizing and vitalizing Korean economical industries. Today, in this debate, we have a proposition, who is proposing to cut all these humanitarian aids given to our brotherhood nation, and exterminate all the benefits the policy has along with it-letting the 2 million starve to death and the industries of South Korea to fall. Our side of the house strongly believes that cutting aid, stopping support, will only trigger detrimental harms to both Koreas and the world, economically and diplomatically, and therefore that the motion should not stand.
On this side of the house, we have three clear arguments to support our stance of the opposition. First, the cutting of all aids will exacerbate the relationships between South and North Korea. Second, the implementation of the Government’s plan will have negative aftermaths on the citizens of North Korea and the economic industries in South Korea. Third, infringement on rights upon people who are willing to provide humanitarian aids will occur when this policy takes place. And along with all these reasons, the opposition side suggests a practical alternative policy that could improve the conditions in status quo and nevertheless evade much of the dire harms and risks of the radical policy the proposition is presenting. We think if the South Korean government only provides aids under specific conditions, demanding the North Korean regime to produce and disclose transparent, credible reports of the usages and distribution of the given aid, the effectiveness of aids will improve dramatically and the practicality issue the Government was so worried about would be dealt with. If North Korea fails to meet such conditions, sanctions on materials other than basic necessities, such as in military equipment could be implemented or even accusations in the International Court could take place as an effective measures for retribution.
So without further due, let’s proceed to the first substantiative argument of our side. However, before doing so, let’s consider why past Korean administrations have constantly delivered aid to North Korea. For past decades, South Korea had experienced major difficulties itself, and countless citizens residing within the nation are still starving to death, lingering in poverty. However, despite these issues, Korea has periodically sent aids to North Korea, because the aid was a “symbol”-a symbol of anticipation towards open communication and peaceful reunification. The assistance was sending out a significant message, that South Korea cares and has compassion in its neighbor’s hardships, and possesses a resolute will to renew communications and strengthen the bond between the Koreas. If our government, all of a sudden, cut all aids, it will send out a message both to North Korea and the world that South Korea no longer has that will-the will to continue conversation. The government's hasty actions of cutting all aids will severely increase the diplomatic tensions in the Korean peninsula, which will likely lead to further conflicts and disastrous results-even casualties. Especially in such sensitive eras for both Koreas and turbulent events occurring everywhere, including the major political transitions North Korea is experiencing with the new leader Kim Jong-il, the cornered-up-and-broke status of the North Korean economy, and military collisions in the Western Sea and regarding Chun-an Ham, -taking a radical stance and worsening the relationships with North Korea is the last position our government would want to take. Whether we truly mean it or not, stopping all support to North Korea will send out hostile messages and call for hostile responses, and so we think the Government’s policy should not take place.
However, we don’t think the consequences of the hasty extermination of aids will just end there; it will cause negative aftermaths on both the individual level of North Korea and national level of South Korea.
First, we recognize that the current situation in North Korea is highly unstable—more than 6 million need urgent food aid due to significant agricultural losses. South Korea has been providing the most significant aid to North Korea (around 500,000 tons of humanitarian aid up to 2008) annually to assist, and now 2 million of them depend their lives totally on South Korean aid. However, the proposition’s policy will stop all forms of South Korean help given to North Korea, which is a major part of the overall aid. Considering the status quo, we believe that if no effort is made to help, the North Korean regime will suffer and eventually collapse due to major food shortages leading to riots and uprisings. There are two significant foreseeable consequences to this crisis. The first is that there will be universal condemnation of South Korea’s attitude towards its once-united ‘brother nation’, from influential international organizations such as UN or NGOs in numerous nations. This condemnation might harm the image of our country in the international society and furthermore even do damage on the future diplomatic relationships with other nations. The second is that following the collapse of the North Korean government, serious turmoil would take place, refugees will cross the borderline into our country, and our nation would be forced to intervene to settle the chaos. What’s even more, is that other relatively powerful neighbor countries (such as China) will intervene and attempt to influence the country, exerting sovereign power. For South Korea, this situation is not only undesirable but it also seriously poses a threat to its national security, since chaos would erupt directly around us and China would expand its influence closer to our borderlines. (thus leaving South Korea to cope with the political and economic tangles). Our government would also have to take its role, to settle conflicts and stop China from being able to exert direct influence in a juxtaposed location with us. Instability that will be caused by the fall of the regime is definitely not something South Korea wants.
Another dire consequence of this policy is the economic loss in South Korea. Most of the materials shipped to North Korea (such as fertilizers or food) are produced directly by Korean companies and farmers. The sudden drop in these exports will inevitably result in a loss of income for these related parties, who had been dependant on the government funding involved in this process. Studies estimate the losses in revenue will reach up to approximately 600 billion won. This shows clearly that the implementation of this policy will result in losses not only for North Korea, but also for South Korea as well. To prevent such outcomes, we should think once again before imposing restrictions on all aids.
Lastly, we think the restricting all provisions of aid, including voluntary ones, is a clear violation of individual rights and freedom for South Koreans. A substantial portion of the aid delivered to North Korea is collected and donated voluntarily-up to 15% of the total support in 2002, by South Korean citizens who are willing to help their brethren. People choose to donate their property for diverse reasons-to help the suffering ones in North Korea or because of the loved ones they had left in the Northern region 65 years ago. However, whatever the cause is for their benevolent actions, the important point is that they “chose to do so”. Out of their humane compassion, they “chose” to donate their belongings, and they should have every right to do so; the government has no say. The freedom of these people to achieve their own purposes should be protected, and we believe it is wrong for the government to violate such freedom.
And for all these reasons, the opposition side has clearly shown to you why the motion should not stand.
On the other hand, many of the points that the Government side gave for the reasons to implement their policy are false and incorrect. First of all, unlike what the proposition would like us to believe, the purpose of the aid we provide to North Korea is not in any sort of a “reward” given to the autocratic regime, but it is to “SAVE THE PEOPLE”-just like the proposition recognized in their second argument. In other words, the aid is being delivered solely for “humanitarian” purposes-to save and rescue the starving, sick citizens of North Korea, and everybody is well aware of this truth, including the members of the opposing house. We think that hardly anyone with common sense in this world would misperceive the intentions of the “basic necessaries”. Next, the argument of the Government about how if we continue to send aids to North Korea, it will both reduce the burden of its government to feed the people and send out a wrongful message that our government accepts and condones all the misdemeanors of the regime, and therefore would lead to the solidification of it, is simply an exaggeration. First of all, the supplies we give to North Korea are not even close to being ABUNDANT or EXCESSIVE; it’s almost the minimum amount of basic goods to keep the North Korean citizens alive. The idea that these “necessary aids” would be sufficient enough to “solidify and reinforce the regime” is going way too far. Furthermore, it’s even more preposterous to think that such aids assist the creation of nuclear weapons or the expansion of military power, because the regime “FOCUSES ON SUCH ISSUES WITH AID OR WITHOUT AID”. Simply put, the North Korean government will spend its budget and invest its efforts to sustain their military capacity at any costs, and don’t care about the welfare of the mass-that’s what is happening in the status quo. So for the regime, the “priority” is their military power, which they will keep their focus concentrated on and which is an issue that will be unaffected by the existence of aids. Bottom line, the supplies we provide have no influence over North Korea’s military capacity whatsoever, and the only difference of its disappearance would be the increased pain and suffering of the North Korean people. Also, we don’t think the delivery of basic merchandise would be interpreted as “a sign of forgiveness” for the wrongdoings of North Korea, as the Government side would like to frame it. International criticisms will continue and sanctions on “un-basic necessities” could be implemented towards North Korea, functioning as moderate but firm measures that give out proper retributions to address North Korea’s faults. We think the radical policy presented by the opposing house will only generate radical responses; cornering the country up will intensify conflicts, which is extremely problematic. Lastly, we also think the government’s point about how the given aid does not reach the North Korean people is both factually incorrect and self-contradictory to their own case; even though some portion of the aid might be taken by corrupted parties or be wasted in irrelevant matters, we don’t think 100% OF EVERYTHING WE GIVE WILL COMPLETELY VANISH INTO THE AIR-a fair amount of the aids actually do reach the people and fulfill their original initiatives-as much as sustaining the lives of 2 million. Also, that is the reason why our side of the house suggested “specific conditions” to be added along to aids, such as the production of transparent reports that shows the usages of the given goods, to ensure the aids be used as we wished. Not only that, but moreover, we think that the government’s point on how “aids decrease the responsibility of the government to feed the people” contradicts their doubt on the North Korean citizen’s practical accessibility to these goods because they conceded to the fact that “AIDS FEED THE PEOPLE”. Therefore, as it is explained and as the opposing house even recognized, there is no question to whether provided supplies actually help the citizens and the argument has been clearly proven.
And for all these reasons, we’re extremely proud to oppose.